




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Prospects for Allied Cooperation at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe

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An Intelligence Assessment

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EUR 84-10084
May 1984

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Prospects for Allied Cooperation at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [] Office
of European Analysis, with a contribution from the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
European Issues Division, EURA, []

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May 1984*

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**Prospects for Allied Cooperation
at the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 20 April 1984
was used in this report.*

The Allies so far have restively supported the United States on policy for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), but most want a new approach for round two of the Stockholm talks. During the first round:

- They rebuffed the East's attempts to focus the negotiations on declaratory measures, especially nonuse of force and no first use of force, and countered Soviet charges that the West is not serious about arms control.
- They also backed the United States in discouraging interest among the Neutral and nonaligned countries in nonuse of force and in measures to limit military activities. At the same time, they attempted to focus attention on the West's own measures on exchange of information on, and prior notification of, conventional military activities.

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But Allied unity on CDE policy is fragile and differences that were papered over during round one are now resurfacing. Most Allies believe that the West cannot afford to continue the stalemate much longer because of public opinion. They especially want to encourage progress at Stockholm while INF talks and START remain suspended. They see CDE as an important forum because of its European focus, broad participation, and potential for demonstrating Western commitment to arms control. Yet, Allies differ both among themselves and with the United States on the technical and substantive aspects of the measures they should support. The Allies, moreover, have not resolved these differences, and some are contemplating revisions to the package and possible new measures

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With diverse national interests and differences over long-term goals for the Conference, the Allies thus face formidable obstacles as they attempt to maintain a consensus for two years of further negotiations. Contrary to US wishes, many NATO members believe the West should consider devising both some sort of declaration on nonuse of force and proposals that limit military activities. They believe the West may eventually have to appear forthcoming on these publicly attractive concepts to get Eastern consideration of NATO's own confidence- and security-building measures.

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NATO members also are seeking better ways to counter Soviet propaganda blaming the West for the suspension of US-Soviet negotiations on nuclear force reductions. Hence, they publicly want to appear forthcoming at Stockholm and committed to making headway toward agreements on conventional force reductions as well as bans on chemical weapons and

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be more flexible not only on CDE but also at the MBFR talks in Vienna and in negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

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West Germany probably will emerge as the most difficult Ally for the United States:

- Most Allies, but especially Bonn, see the Conference as an important forum for discussing security issues, especially while the INF talks and START are suspended.
- In our judgment, the Kohl government is likely to lead Allied efforts to step up pressure for Western proposals on nonuse of force and for constraints on conventional military activities.

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Moscow, meanwhile, will continue to press its own initiatives and use the Conference to undermine Allied cohesion on INF and other Western security policies. The Soviets also will continue to denounce the West's measures as useless, and extol the confidence-building attributes of the East's proposals for agreements on nonuse of force, no first use of force, creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones, and a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe.

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Key Developments Leading Up to CDE

1975	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Helsinki concludes; ineffective confidence-building measures included in Final Act. <input type="text"/>	25X1
1978	French President Giscard d'Estaing proposes a CDE; initial Allied reaction negative. <input type="text"/>	25X1
1978-79	Allied support for French idea builds; Soviets offer their own proposal; French revise their plan, making CDE part of CSCE Review process. <input type="text"/>	25X1
November 1979	EC foreign ministers formally endorse phase one of CDE. Turkey and Canada follow suit. <input type="text"/>	25X1
November 1980	CSCE Review Conference convenes in Madrid. <input type="text"/>	25X1
Fall 1980	NATO deliberates contentiously on package of confidence-building measures intended for CSCE Review Conference; CBMs not tabled. <input type="text"/>	25X1
January 1981	US drops opposition to CDE. <input type="text"/>	25X1
September 1983	Madrid CSCE meeting ends. Mandate for CDE is part of concluding document. <input type="text"/>	25X1
October-November 1983	CDE Preparatory Conference takes place in Helsinki. <input type="text"/>	25X1
17 January 1984	CDE begins at Stockholm <input type="text"/>	25X1
16 March 1984	End of round one. <input type="text"/>	25X1
8 May 1984	Round two begins. <input type="text"/>	25X1

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Prospects for Allied Cooperation at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe

Introduction

The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began in the late 1970s as a French idea that for a long time received little support. By the time the Conference began this January, however, it had emerged as an important forum for East-West exchanges on security issues, chiefly because of the suspension of Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear forces.

CDE is not, in fact, well suited for East-West negotiations. Because it is an offshoot of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, all 35 CSCE participants are taking part. Although many are members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, a number of Neutral and nonaligned countries are also present, as is the Holy See. As in CSCE, all decisions at the Conference must be by "consensus," which means that none of the 35 countries objects. The participants, in practice, have not yet been able to agree even on the definition of confidence- and security-building measures they should address.

When this unwieldy Conference began in January, NATO members had not yet completed the package of confidence- and security-building measures that was to be the basis of the Western position. By the second week, they decided to set aside their remaining differences in order to make a show of unity and present the West's proposals. This strained consensus continued through round one of the Conference, despite the Allies' differing attitudes toward Eastern insistence that CDE focus deliberations on nonuse and no first use of force and toward Neutral interest in a nonaggression pledge and limits on military

¹ CSBMs—also referred to simply as confidence-building measures (CBMs)—are formally defined by NATO as measures adopted to increase mutual knowledge of national military activities (for example, notification of exercises, reserve callups, and alerts) thereby reducing the risk of surprise attack in Europe. The Neutrals contend that force reductions are legitimate CSBMs. Allies, Neutrals, and the USSR—Eastern bloc claim that so-called declaratory measures, such as non use of force and nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zones, fall under this rubric.

Participants in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe

The West

Belgium ^a	Norway
Netherlands ^a	Greece ^a
Denmark ^a	Portugal
France ^a	West Germany ^a
Iceland	Spain
Britain ^a	Turkey
Italy ^a	Canada
Luxembourg ^a	United States
Ireland ^{a b}	

The East

Bulgaria	Hungary
Czechoslovakia	Poland
East Germany	Romania ^c

USSR

Neutral and Nonaligned

Sweden	Malta
Finland	Cyprus
Austria	Liechtenstein
Yugoslavia	San Marino
Switzerland	Holy See
Monaco	


^a EC member.

^b Not a member of NATO.

^c Behaves autonomously although a member of the Warsaw Pact.

activities. Many Allies, however, have grown restless under US strictures that the West refuse to address declaratory measures and military constraints, and they want to demonstrate publicly their commitment to making progress toward a CDE agreement in round two.

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Participants in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe^a

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This paper examines the sources and extent of US-West European differences over policy for CDE and the outlook for Allied unity on tactics and policy over the months ahead. []

US-West European Differences

Allied discussions on a European Disarmament Conference, which began seriously in 1979, have been plagued by fundamental differences between the United States and its NATO partners over Alliance policy toward the Conference. The United States saw weaknesses in the forum itself—the large number of participants and the opportunities for the Soviets to make propaganda points, manipulate the Neutrals, and split the Allies—and wanted to limit negotiations to CSBMs outlining procedures for notification of military activity and exchange of information. Many NATO members, on the other hand, liked CDE because of its European focus, broad participation, and potential for underscoring the Western commitment to arms control. They were not as concerned, therefore, with limiting negotiations to carefully circumscribed CSBMs. They also differed with the United States on the technical and substantive aspects of the measures the West should propose. These differences in approach became even more apparent as NATO began its deliberations on CSBMs for the Conference. []

Disagreement on CSBMs

NATO members first tried to devise joint CSBMs five years ago with the intention of tabling them at the Madrid CSCE Review Conference as a follow-on to the measures adopted in the Helsinki Final Act.² Following prolonged and contentious deliberations, the Allies in late 1980 informally adopted an incomplete package of measures, which they promptly shelved. Some of the proposals lacked details while others—such as verification measures—existed in name only. In addition, the Allies were unable to reach agreement on specific military activities to be subject to notification, on key definitions, and on

² The measures agreed to at Helsinki included advance notification of 21 days for ground force maneuvers exceeding 25,000 troops; voluntary advance notification of smaller maneuvers and other military activities; and exchange of observers and military delegations []

verification procedures. Because compromise appeared unlikely, the Allies also were forced to omit certain measures that some of them strongly wanted to include: notification of non-European forces that transit through Europe and constraints on major military activities. The United States was opposed to notification of transits because its own out-of-area activities would be affected. It viewed constraint measures as outside the scope of CDE. []

Many of these areas of disagreement were still present three years later, in September of last year, when the United States submitted to NATO a revised version of the NATO CSBMs to serve as the basis of the Western proposals for CDE. Intensive discussions on the revised package began a few weeks before the CDE preparatory meeting in October. But by early January, NATO members still had not resolved certain key issues, including the number of inspections each country should accept, the extent of information to be exchanged on military forces, and how to deal with non-European forces that transit through Europe. []

The transit issue was particularly thorny. Led by the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Canada, most Allies were firm that language on forces that transit the "CDE zone" should be included in the Western package. The dispute continued into the first week of the Conference, threatening to disrupt the display of unity the Allies intended to make for the opening of the Conference. NATO members finally agreed to exclude transits from the package of CSBMs after intense pressure from the United States, but the Kohl government emphasized that the issue was not dead. []

The Allies agreed to discuss later their other outstanding differences and presented the West's proposals at the Conference shortly after it convened. Nonetheless, Allied discussions at Stockholm and Brussels during the first month of the Conference were dominated by these remaining differences, leaving NATO members little opportunity to discuss strategy for dealing with Eastern and Neutral proposals. []

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Outline of the West's Position at Stockholm**Measure One****Exchange of Military Information**

At the beginning of each year, participants agree to exchange information on their ground forces and land-based air formations in the CDE zone.

Measure Two**Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance**

Participants will exchange annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities in the CDE zone.

Measure Three**Notification of Military Activities**

Out-of-garrison land activities in the CDE zone, whether independent or combined with air and/or amphibious support, will be notified 45 days in advance.

Measure Four**Observation of Pertinent Military Activities**

The host state will invite observers from the other participating states to all notifiable activities.

Measure Five**Compliance and Verification**

Each participant will be required to submit to a limited number of on-site inspections to verify compliance with notifiable military activities. Each state agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other participants.

Measure Six**Development of Means of Communications**

Participants will make arrangements for enhanced communications, such as telex, telephone, or other communications, for consultations and invitations to observers.

Dealing With the Soviets at Stockholm

The Allies only recently began to discuss ways to deal with Soviet tactics at Stockholm. The USSR, aware of Allied differences, has attempted to exploit them since the Conference started by advancing a few

Eastern Proposals

- Agreement to no first use of nuclear weapons.
- Adoption of a non-use-of-force treaty.
- Creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones in Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans. 25X1
- Creation of a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe.
- Agreement to restrict military spending. 25X1
- Agreement to limit the scope and size of military exercises.
- Notification of independent air and naval activities.
- Expansion of the confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act. 25X1 25X1

publicly attractive, declaratory proposals. Both Moscow and its East European partners have been insisting that CDE address these proposals, particularly those calling for agreements on nonuse of force and no first use of force.³ The East also has used the Conference to assail NATO for inflexibility on arms control and has stressed US "willingness" to resort to nuclear warfare first. 25X1 25X1

For the USSR the Stockholm meeting has acquired considerable importance with the suspension of START and INF negotiations. The Conference is an appealing propaganda platform from which the Soviets can make their arms control case to Western audiences and attempt to undermine European support for Western security policies. Moscow hopes that it can force the West to address its proposals by refusing to negotiate on NATO's CSBMs until the

³ Romania, a member of the Warsaw Pact, has presented its own proposals, which include limitations on both military spending and force levels, notification of military activities, and a nonaggression agreement. 25X1

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Allies agree to discuss declaratory proposals. It continues to denounce the Allied measures as insufficient to build confidence in Europe. []

The Soviets, moreover, do not consider the question of the geographic scope of CSBMs to be closed by the language of the CDE mandate. The USSR and its allies have reopened the issue by advocating notification of air and naval maneuvers adjacent to the European Continent but independent of activities there. []

Since the Conference began, the Allies have been publicly supportive of the Western package of CSBMs and have followed, albeit restively, the US lead on negotiating tactics. Thus, they have rebuffed the overtures of Moscow and its partners that CDE focus on declaratory measures rather than NATO's measures on notification and exchange of information and have encouraged the Neutrals to do likewise. They also have rebutted Soviet rhetoric on INF deployments and Western inflexibility on arms control. []

But recent Allied deliberations on future strategy for the Conference, including statements of Allied officials, reveal that many Allies now want to address certain Eastern proposals or at least believe the West must decide how to deal with them:

- Virtually all Allies appear to accept that the West—for the sake of public opinion and to gain Soviet agreement to discuss Western CSBMs—should support some type of non-use-of-force pledge.
- Norwegian officials emphasize that Oslo is officially opposed to the creation of a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone but admit that Norwegian public opinion favors the idea, and that it will be difficult in the long run to maintain this position if Sweden decides to support the idea strongly.

* Much of the Madrid CSCE Review Conference was taken up with the difficult issue of the zone of coverage for CSBMs. The USSR was willing to extend the eastern boundary to the Ural Mountains in return for extension of the western boundary to an unspecified area in the Atlantic. Moscow's aim was to make a broader range of Allied naval and air activities subject to confidence- and security-building measures. CSCE participants ultimately agreed on vague language that extended the zone to cover those military activities in "adjoining sea area and airspace," which were an integral part of notifiable maneuvers by ground forces. []

- The Allies agree that a global ban on chemical weapons should be negotiated at Geneva in the Committee on Disarmament. But West Germany, Norway, Canada, Denmark, and Belgium believe that the West should not reject outright the Soviet proposal for a European zone. Bonn and Ottawa have expressed qualified interest in a European zone as a first step toward a global ban. 25X1
- Denmark and Norway favor notification of independent naval activities. Bonn, and perhaps Britain and France, favor a measure on independent air activities. 25X1
- West Germany and the Netherlands in particular, but also most other Allies, have voiced support for considering constraints on military activities and for devising a Western proposal along these lines.

Lastly, Moscow has been hinting that it will raise the issue of notification of non-European forces that transit through Europe. Most Allies favor inclusion of such language in a CDE agreement. [] 25X1

The Neutrals and Allied Unity

The positions of the neutral and nonaligned countries continue to be a major preoccupation of the Allies in formulating policy for CDE. Most NATO members do not want the Alliance to be perceived publicly as thwarting the desires of the Neutrals. The Allies also are aware that they will need the support of the Neutrals on NATO CSBMs and that the Neutrals could help them counter Eastern attempts to focus negotiations on declaratory proposals. At the same time, the Allies know that many Neutrals are sympathetic to some of the Eastern proposals. [] 25X1

During round one, the Neutrals spent much of the time arguing among themselves. Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland circulated proposals they wished to include in a Neutral package. Sweden, for example, wanted limits on troop levels and equipment, notification of independent air exercises, and a nonaggression agreement. Yugoslavia called for exchange of information on defense spending, ceilings on military

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maneuvers, a ban on introducing new forces or weapons of mass destruction in Europe, and reductions of military forces in "certain border areas." Switzerland called for constraints and a nonaggression agreement as well as Western-style CSBMs. The more conservative Neutrals—Austria and Finland—primarily played a mediating role among the others. In the meantime, the Allies attempted to convince the Neutrals to abandon their interest in constraints and nonuse of force in favor of addressing the Allied measures. [REDACTED]

The Neutrals managed to defer their differences and presented the general outline of a common set of measures at the end of round one. The proposals focused on exchange of information and prior notification and observation of military activities, including measures for ceilings on forces involved in major military maneuvers and specific smaller activities, and limits on equipment used in offensive operations. The Neutrals also advocated a reference to nonuse of force in the preamble of a CDE agreement. [REDACTED]

Finnish and Austrian officials have noted that most Neutrals believe that their real contribution to CDE is their support for constraints on military activities. Even the most conservative Neutrals also contend that they must support some type of nonaggression language to gain Eastern willingness to negotiate on nondeclaratory measures. [REDACTED]

Beyond this, all the Neutrals have their own perceived security interests. We expect them to continue, therefore, to disagree among themselves on the scope and substance of both their CSBMs and the NATO measures and on whether they should propose additional measures or support future Eastern proposals. They also have questioned the Allies about how the West will handle prior notification of non-European forces that transit through Europe to another destination and are likely to back any Eastern measure along these lines. [REDACTED]

The West German Factor

West Germany is the Ally with the most ambitious CDE policy, and as the Conference develops, Bonn will likely pose problems for the United States. Bonn

has warned that it may raise the transit issue again and is in the forefront of those Allies who want the West to develop positions on nonuse of force and constraints on military activities. It also wants the West to devise proposals on notification of independent air exercises. [REDACTED]

Among NATO members, Bonn has the greatest hope for achieving tangible benefits from CDE. The Kohl government sees the Conference as a key policy tool for emphasizing the West's commitment to detente and arms control, especially now that INF talks and START are suspended. Bonn also hopes to deflect public attention from INF deployments, reinforce the CSCE process, and make Europe the geographic focus of conventional arms talks rather than West Germany, as is the case with MBFR. [REDACTED]

West Germany's aim thus is to go beyond the notification and observation measures that comprise the West's policy in the direction of arms control. In a paper on joint Western strategy for CDE presented within NATO and in subsequent papers, Bonn has proposed integrating CDE into "an overall concept for conventional arms control in Europe," with the eventual goal of arms reductions. Bonn also wants the West to use the Conference to counter Soviet propaganda and to address declaratory proposals by advancing its own ideas on nonuse of force. It believes the West can best follow this strategy by linking broad arms control goals with concrete security issues. [REDACTED]

On the relationship between CDE and MBFR, Bonn in the past has suggested linking the two forums, possibly by handling MBFR-related confidence- and security-building measures in CDE while the MBFR talks focus on verification of conventional force reductions. Some defense officials in Bonn have long felt that MBFR might eventually become a "subset" of CDE. West German officials occasionally have pointed out that most CDE participants accept that the second phase of the Stockholm Conference should deal with force reductions. Recently, they have even suggested that NATO could get around the stalemate in the MBFR talks by negotiating conventional force reductions at CDE. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Most of the Allies do not want to continue the round-one stalemate into the next negotiating session. Allied deliberations on strategy for round two indicate that the United States is becoming increasingly isolated in its approach to nonuse of force and constraints on military activities:

- West Germany late last year proposed including limits on military activities in NATO's package of CSBMs, but withdrew its proposal after pressure from the United States.
- At the meeting of the NATO Council, upon conclusion of round one, most Allied representatives observed that the West would have to make some concessions to the East and the Neutrals, specifically on nonuse of force and constraints, to get negotiations going on CSBMs.
- Belgian, French, Danish, Dutch, and West German experts on CDE argued in early April for Allied consideration of constraints that the West could present at Stockholm. They received conditional support from the British and Norwegian representatives, who suggested NATO should first complete analysis of the Neutral and Romanian measures to limit military activities.
- French officials recently claimed that Paris is working up a few "cosmetic" constraints for NATO to consider. [redacted]

The Allies do not anticipate marked changes in the Soviet approach to CDE. They believe that Moscow will not drop its insistence that the Conference negotiate a treaty on nonuse of force. They also believe the Soviets will continue to focus on deployments of NATO INF in Western Europe and to claim that, as a result of Pershing II deployments, the Alliance now enjoys a nuclear first-strike capability. Anticipating continued Soviet intransigence, the Allies have thought increasingly in terms of trade-offs. For example, they view an affirmation of nonaggression, if used to "crown" a CDE agreement comprised of Western-style CSBMs, as innocuous. Similarly, most Allies have come to view Western willingness to negotiate limits on military activities as a useful way to get

discussions on CSBMs on track, since both the Neutrals and the East have advanced such measures. They believe this tactic will reassure the Neutrals that they are taken seriously by the West, as well as counter Moscow's strategy of focusing CDE negotiations on nuclear issues. [redacted]

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Overall, the Allies want to demonstrate to their publics that the Alliance is committed to making progress toward an agreement at Stockholm. They want to divert attention from continuing INF deployments in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy, and counter Soviet charges of Western foot-dragging on arms control. They also want to be able publicly to match Moscow's claim that it is eager to make progress in various multilateral forums. They want the West to appear responsive to Soviet initiatives not only in CDE but at the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where participants are addressing such diverse arms control issues as space weapons and bans on chemical weapons and nuclear testing. At the same time, they want to ensure that their individual military, political, and economic interests are not adversely affected by future agreements. These Allies, therefore, anxiously awaited the emergence of the US draft treaty banning chemical weapons worldwide, but were quick to criticize as intrusive its requirement for mandatory, on-site inspection. On the MBFR negotiations, Bonn in particular aggressively advanced revisions to the new proposal the West recently presented to the East at Vienna, in part to ensure that West German forces would not be unfairly constrained. [redacted]

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Bonn's new assertiveness on arms control issues, evident so far primarily in MBFR, is likely to be felt soon in CDE as well. We believe that in Allied deliberations, Bonn may present its own versions of proposals on nonuse of force and for constraints on military activities. Such an approach could torpedo attempts by the United States to keep the Allies united behind its own strategy for the next round of the Conference. It would also provide the USSR ample opportunity to exploit Allied dissension. [redacted]

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Maintaining Allied unity on CDE will become even more problematic when the Conference finally moves beyond debating what to negotiate to actual deliberations on CSBMs. NATO still has not completed its own package of measures. Outstanding issues include the level of military information to be exchanged, the number, duration, and timing of inspections, and the type of European communications system to be established. In addition, Moscow has indicated that it will raise the issue of prior notification of non-European forces that transit through Europe. Thus, the existing tenuous consensus on most of the NATO package could disintegrate as the East and the Neutrals begin to question Allied concepts, parameters, and definitions and to propose their own alternatives. [REDACTED]

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Allied disagreement on CDE policy may mean a stronger role for the EC. Delegates of the 10 EC countries met weekly at Stockholm during round one, but did not attempt to take joint positions counter to agreed Alliance policy. However, with the EC beset by chronic budgetary and structural problems, EC members may be tempted to demonstrate their unity on political issues. They traditionally have done well in coordinating policy on CSCE tactics and could do so at Stockholm even though forging a consensus on most CDE issues would be difficult. [REDACTED]

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In subsequent CDE negotiations, therefore, the United States almost certainly will face demands from its Allies, as well as the East and the Neutrals, to modify its political objectives and the scope and substance of the West's confidence- and security-building measures. The complex and sensitive nature of the CSBMs and the diverse aims of the 35 participants all but ensure that no agreement will be reached in the first year of the Conference. If the second year also does not produce a consensus, it will be left to the next CSCE review meeting, set for Vienna in 1986, to decide whether to continue the negotiations. [REDACTED]

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